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HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS AS A 




Professor Judith Gardam's distinguished record of scholarship speaks for itself. 
What is less well known is Judith's record as an inspiring teacher and colleague. 
To those of us who were fortunate to be her students, Judith conveyed not only 
her enthusiasm for, and commitment to, international law, but also her intellectual 
discipline. No student of Judith's could forget her admonitions on the importance to 
scholars of international law of striving to truly understand its sources. As a colleague, 
I found supervising doctoral candidates with Judith a pleasure because of her interest 
in their projects and her dedication to mentoring the next generation of scholars. The 
humanity that pervades Judith's scholarship and teaching is all the more powerful 
because of the rigorous and disciplined approach to the law which is her hallmark.
The limits of the powers of the Security Council have been the subject of 
considerable debate since the rise of the Security Council which accompanied the end 
of the Cold War.2 Notwithstanding the absence of any organ competent to engage in 
1 The author thanks Dr Kim Sorensen for his outstanding research assistance.
2 See, for example, Dapo Akande, 'The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is 
There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?' (1997) 46 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 309, 338-9; Jose E Alvarez, 'Judging the Security Council' 
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a review of the Council's decisions,3 and irrespective of the political character of many 
of its most important functions,4 the Council's powers are nonetheless not unlimited. 
Indeed, the recent practice to be examined in this chapter has demonstrated that 
(1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 1, 4; Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership 
in the United Nations (Article  4 of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1948] ICJ  Rep  57, 64; Martti 
Koskenniemi, 'The Place of Law in Collective Security' (1996) 17 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 455, 455-90; Anne Peters, 'Article  25' in Bruno Simma  et  al (eds), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 787, 807-42; M Michael Reisman and 
Douglas L Stevick, 'The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Economic 
Sanction Programmes' (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 86; Stefan Talmon, 'The Security 
Council as World Legislature' (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 175, 175-93. On related 
debates about calls to reform the UNSC, see, for example, Yehuda S Blum, 'Proposals for UN Security 
Council Reform' (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 632, 632-49; Richard Gowan and 
Nora Gordon, Pathways to Security Council Reform (May 2014) Center on International Cooperation, 
New York University <http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/pathways_sc_reform_final.pdf>; Panel of 
Eminent Persons on United Nations — Civil Society Relations, We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United 
Nations and Global Governance — Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations — Civil 
Society Relations, UN Doc A/58/817 (11 June 2004) 10, 45-6 [95]-[100]; Strengthening of the United 
Nations: An Agenda for Further Change — Report of the Security‑General, 57th  sess, Agenda Item 53, 
UN Doc A/57/387 (9 September 2002) 8-9 [20]-[22]; Bart MJ Szewczyk, 'Variable Multipolarity and 
UN Security Council Reform' (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 451, 451-70, 497-9, 500-4; 
Thomas G Weiss, 'The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform' (2003) 26 Washington Quarterly 147, 
147-59.
3 Even the International Court of Justice has said it does not have the power to review SC decisions: 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution  276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1975] 
ICJ Rep 16, 45 [89]. See generally Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution 
of the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 99-101; Kenneth Manusama, The United 
Nations Security Council in the Post‑Cold War Era: Applying the Principle of Legality (Martinus Nijhoff, 
2006) 3-46; August Reinisch, 'Introduction' in August Reinisch (ed), Challenging Acts of International 
Organizations Before National Courts (Oxford University Press, 2010) 1, 1-17; Antonios Tzanakopoulos, 
'Domestic Court Reactions to UN Security Council Sanctions' in August Reinisch (ed), Challenging 
Acts of International Organizations Before National Courts (Oxford University Press, 2010) 54, 54-76. 
On debates about judicial review of the UNSC by the ICJ, see, for example, Alvarez, above n 2, 1-39; 
DW Bowett, 'Judicial and Political Functions of the Security and the International Court of Justice' 
in Hazel Fox (ed), The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, 1997) 73, 77-88; Charter of the United Nations art 36(3) ('Charter'); Kathleen 
Renée Cronin-Furman, 'The International Court of Justice and the United Nations Security Council: 
Rethinking a Complicated Relationship' (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 435, 443-7, 460-1.
4 On the 'political', non-justiciable character of SC  decisions, under  art  39 of the Charter, to 
establish international criminal tribunals, see Prosecutor v Kanyabashi (Decision on the Defence Motion of 
Jurisdiction) (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber II, Case No ICTR-96-15-T, 
18 December 1997) [20]; Prosecutor v Milošević (Decision on Preliminary Motions) (International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case No IT-02-54, 8 November 2001) [5]-[11]; 
Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction) (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case No IT-94-1, 10 August 1995) [24], [44]. Cf Prosecutor v Tadić 
(Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) (International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995) [24].
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its powers are subject to important collateral limits arising from the human rights 
obligations of states.
The response of international law to the rise of the Security Council was a 
topic addressed by Judith Gardam in her 1996 article in the Michigan Journal of 
International Law entitled 'Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement 
Action'. Here, Gardam argued that, when undertaking military enforcement 
actions, the Security Council was bound by requirements of proportionality and 
necessity analogous to those applicable in the jus ad bellum,5 and also by the rules of 
international humanitarian law forming the jus in bello.6 This chapter looks not to 
uses of force, but to sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Nonetheless, two of 
Gardam's concluding observations make for a suitable starting point for this analysis. 
First, she noted the legal character of the Charter:
The text of the Charter, a legal document, is not only compatible with but 
arguably, through its emphasis on human rights and humanitarian values, 
requires the Security Council to measure its responses against legal criteria.7
Second, Gardam noted the significance of the rise of human rights law within the 
body of international law:
It is inconceivable that it was intended that the use of force in all circumstances, 
except self-defence, would be granted to a political body subject to no legal 
controls whatsoever. This runs counter to the increasingly important role 
that international law is perceived to play in the international community, 
particularly in the area of human rights.8
These two points apply with equal force to this chapter's consideration of non-forceful 
sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter as they do to authorisations to use force 
under Article 42.
Arguably, the most important context in which human rights obligations have 
been used as a collateral limit on the Security Council's powers in recent practice is in 
respect of states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).9 
This chapter examines both the European practice and also challenges under 
5 Judith Gardam, 'Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action' (1996) 17 
Michigan Journal of International Law 285, 293, 301-12.
6 Ibid 294, 295 n 33, 301-2, 312-20, 322.
7 Ibid 321.
8 Ibid 322.
9 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 
4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) as amended by Protocol No 14 
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control 




international human rights law to the lawfulness of states' implementations of their 
obligations under the Charter.10
The second section of this chapter will address the potential conceptual 
approaches to the relationship between human rights obligations and the law 
of the Charter. The third section examines five key cases in which human rights 
obligations have been invoked before regional or international bodies to challenge the 
implementation of Security Council Resolutions.11 This examination focuses solely 
on the question of the relationship between human rights obligations and the law 
of the Charter in each case. The final section offers observations on the significance 
of the practice examined in this chapter and identifies some unresolved issues that 
remain to be addressed in the future practice of states and institutions. The purpose 
of this chapter is to clarify current regional and international practice in respect of 
the use of the human rights obligations of states to serve as a collateral limit on the 
powers of the Security Council, and to consider what the future consequences of such 
practice might be.
ConCEPtuaL aPProaChEs
The question of collateral limits on the powers of the Security Council is not one of 
interpretation of the Charter alone. These challenges impose collateral limits on the 
powers of the Security Council because each begins from the basis of human rights 
law, and then considers its relationship to the Charter. Thus the limitations that apply 
arise not from the Charter as a matter of internal logic, but from international human 
rights law overlaying a logic external to the Charter. For this reason, the extensive 
10 A related topic, but one that is outside the scope of this chapter, is the potential for challenges 
within national courts to operate in a similar way. See, for example, Abdelrazik v Minister of Foreign 
Affairs [2009] FC 580 (Federal Court of Canada); Ahmed v Her Majesty's Treasury [2010] 2 AC 534 
(Supreme Court, UK); R (Al‑Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] 1 AC 332 (House of Lords, 
UK).
11 These five decisions most clearly raise the issue of the resolution of potential conflicts between 
international human rights law and the law of the Charter. Other cases touch on these issues. 
However, even in Al‑Jedda v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 
Application No 27021/08, 7 July 2011) ('Al‑Jedda (ECtHR)'), there was no need to reconcile the two 
bodies of law due to the Grand Chamber's conclusion that the relevant Security Council Resolution did 
not in fact require the conduct which was alleged to be in breach of human rights obligations. As the 
Court said at 58 [105]:
The Court does not consider that the language used in this Resolution indicates unambiguously that 
the Security Council intended to place Member States  …  under an obligation to use measures of 
indefinite internment without charge and without judicial guarantees, in breach of their undertakings 
under international human rights instruments … In the absence of clear provision to the contrary, the 
presumption must be that the Security Council intended States … to contribute towards the maintenance 
of security in Iraq while complying with their obligations under international human rights law.
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literature on the internal limits of the powers of the Security Council12 is not directly 
relevant to this chapter.
The question of the relationship between the Charter and the body of 
international human rights law may be resolved through the application of one of (at 
least) three conceptual approaches. Two of these approaches, which are interpretive 
tools of international law applicable generally and which were examined by the 
International Law Commission in its Fragmentation of International Law study, are 
lex superior and harmonisation.13 A third potential approach is autonomy.
The approach of autonomy would lead to human rights institutions applying 
their normal rules and procedures, ignoring any potential consequences for the law 
of the Charter (this has also been called dualism). The potential for autonomous 
application of particular areas of international law was the motivating concern behind 
the International Law Commission's work on the Fragmentation of International 
Law. Observing 'the emergence of specialised and (relatively) autonomous rules or 
rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice'14 as a key challenge, 
the Commission's report formulated the problem posed by this development as being 
that
such specialized law-making and institution-building tends to take place with 
relative ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in the adjoining 
fields and of the general principles and practices of international law. The result 
is conflicts between rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices and, 
possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on the law.15
12 See, for example, Fassbender, above n 3, chs 4-6; Joy Gordon, 'The Sword of Damocles: Revisiting 
the Question of Whether the United Nations Security Council is Bound by International Law' (2012) 
12 Chicago Journal of International Law 605, 616-45; Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Police in the Temple: 
Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View' (1995) 6 European Journal of International Law 325, 
325-8, 338-48; Manusama, above n 3, 1-46; Gabriël H Oosthuizen, 'Playing the Devil's Advocate: 
the United Nations Security Council is Unbound by Law' (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 549, 549-58; Aziz Tuffi Saliba, 'Is the Security Council Legibus Solutus? An Analysis of the Legal 
Restraints of the UNSC' (2012) 20 Michigan State International Law Review 401, 401-19. On the 
external limits of SC powers, see, for example, Devika Hovell, 'A Dialogue Model: The Role of the 
Domestic Judge in Security Council Decision-Making' (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 
579, 579-97; Tzanakopoulos, above n 3, 54-76.
13 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission, finalised by Martti Koskenniemi, UN  Doc  A/CN.4/L.682 (13  April  2006) 24-8 






Whilst the purpose of the Fragmentation study was to respond to the dangers of 
autonomous application of individual legal regimes, autonomy remains one of the 
potential approaches to the relationship between international human rights law and 
the law of the Charter. Autonomy has the advantage of clarity, but raises critical 
questions about the special status of the Charter in international law, and is inherently 
unappealing due to the fact that the result of this approach is that a state must choose 
which of two competing regimes it will violate.
A second possible conceptual approach to the relationship between these 
international legal regimes is to apply the maxim lex superior. One of the classic 
examples of lex superior is the Charter,16 Article 103 of which dictates:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail.
Adopting this approach to the question of the relationship between Charter 
obligations and obligations under international human rights law, the solution would 
be simple — the Charter obligation would prevail. This was the form of lex superior 
apparently invoked by the International Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua when, rejecting the assertion of the United States 
that Nicaragua was compelled to exhaust the Contadora process before it could 
invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court added:
Furthermore, it is also important always to bear in mind that all regional, 
bilateral, and even multilateral, arrangements that the Parties to this case may 
have made, touching on the issue of settlement of disputes or the jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice, must be made always subject to the provisions 
of Article 103 of the Charter.17
The one qualification to this absolutist approach is that the Charter obligation could 
not prevail if the conduct required under the Charter were in violation of a jus cogens 
norm, because in that instance the jus cogens norm would prevail.18 Despite the 
simplicity of this approach, its problem is that it assigns no weight or significance to 
important areas of international law which are not the lex superior: in this case, the 
body of international human rights law.
16 Ibid 168-73 [328]-[340].
17 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Reps 392, 440 [107] (emphasis added).
18 Fassbender, above n 3, 590; Fragmentation of International Law, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 176-8 
[346]-[350]; Andreas L Paulus, 'Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and Fragmentation' (2005) 74 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 297, 317-8 (but see 318-19); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened 
for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS (entered into force 27 January 1980) arts 53, 64.
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A third possible conceptual approach, harmonisation (also known as systemic 
or systematic integration), is more nuanced. The need to harmonise competing 
regimes of international law is tacitly accepted in Article  31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which prescribes the rule of treaty interpretation: 
'There shall be taken into account, together with the context … any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties'.
In Fragmentation of International Law, the International Law Commission 
examined harmonisation at length.19 Its report held out the hope that 'although … two 
norms seemed to point in diverging directions, after some adjustment, it is still possible 
to apply or understand them in such way that no overlap or conflict will remain'.20 
This was said to require 'an attempt to reach a resolution that integrates the conflicting 
obligations in some optimal way in the general context of international law'.21 Later 
in the report, it was said that 'it seems more appropriate to play down that sense of 
conflict and to read the relevant materials from the perspective of their contribution to 
some generally shared — "systemic" — objective'.22 Similarly, it was argued that 'the 
principle of integration … points to the need to carry out the interpretation so as to 
see the rules in view of some comprehensible and coherent objective, to prioritize concerns 
that are more important at the cost of less important objectives'.23
Applying harmonisation to the interaction of the Charter with international 
human rights law is an inherently more complex process than applying either the 
19 On the report's treatment of harmonisation, see Jörg Kammerhofer, 'Systemic Integration, Legal 
Theory and the ILC' (2008) 19 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 157. On harmonisation more 
generally, see, for example, Philipe Sands, 'Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of International 
Law' (1998) 1 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 85; Campbell McLachlan, 'The Principle 
of Systemic Integration and Article  31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention' (2005) 54 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 279; Nele Matz-Lück, 'Harmonization, Systemic Integration, and 
"Mutual Supportiveness" as Conflict-Solution Techniques' (2006) 17 Finnish Yearbook of International 
Law 39; Duncan French, 'Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Rules' (2006) 
55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 281; Freya Baetens, 'Muddling the Waters of Treaty 
Interpretation? Relevant Rules of International Law in the MOX Plant OSPAR Arbitration and EC–
Biotech Case' (2008) 77 Nordic Journal of International Law 197; Campbell McLachlan, 'Investment 
Treaties And General International Law' (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 361; 
Benn MacGrady, 'Fragmentation of International Law or "Systemic Integration" of Treaty Regimes: 
EC–Biotech Products and the Proper Interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties' (2008) 42 Journal of World Trade 589.
20 Fragmentation of International Law, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 28 [43] (emphasis added).
21 Ibid (emphasis added).
22 Ibid 207 [412] (emphasis added).
23 Ibid 211 [419] (emphasis added). In one instance, harmonisation is not necessary. See Fragmentation 
of International Law, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 169 [331] (references omitted):
The question has sometimes been raised whether also Council resolutions adopted ultra vires prevail by 
virtue of Article 103. Since obligations for Member States of the United Nations can only derive out of 
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hierarchical rule of lex superior or the dualism of autonomy. Nonetheless, at the 
conceptual level, the desirability of harmonisation is clear: both the Charter and 
international human rights law are regimes of great importance, and neither should 
be permitted to obliterate the other. However, even at this level of abstraction, the 
difficulties of harmonisation are also apparent: there is no real sense of how the 
'adjustment' spoken of is to be made, other than by reference to the identification 
of some 'shared' or 'coherent objective' which enables an interpreter to 'prioritize' 
a particular goal. Applying such an approach in practice will hardly be without its 
challenges.24
The purpose of this section has been to identify the most important potential 
conceptual approaches to the relationship between the Charter and international 
human rights law. The clarity of the application of the Charter as lex superior (even 
allowing for the potential impact of jus cogens norms), or of human rights law 
autonomously, stands in contrast to the complexity of the harmonisation approach. 
Equally, however, the merits of harmonisation are also clear: as Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal noted in the Arrest Warrant Case, international law seeks 
an 'accommodation' of competing values 'and not the triumph of one norm over 
another'.25 As the following analysis will demonstrate, the choice from amongst these 
three competing approaches will determine the extent to which the human rights 
obligations of states can function as a collateral limit on the powers of the Security 
Council.
such resolutions that are taken within the limits of its powers, decisions ultra vires do not give rise to any 
obligations to begin with.
If a decision of the Security Council is made ultra vires, there is no harmonisation required in the event 
of any inconsistency with other obligations. This approach is consonant with the wording of art 25 itself: 
'to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter' 
(emphasis added).
Nonetheless, it will be a rare instance where this limit applies, given the broad scope of discretion the 
Security Council (and other organs) enjoys under the Charter after the ICJ  in its Certain Expenses 
(Advisory Opinion) sanctioned the pursuit of any actions serving the Purposes of the Organization: 
'These purposes are broad indeed … when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion 
that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization': (Certain Expenses of the United 
Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Reps 151, 168).
24 Compare, for example, the approach of the majority of the Grand Chamber in Hassan v United 
Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application  No  29750/09, 
14 September 2014) to the co-application of international humanitarian law and the ECHR, with the 
partly dissenting judgment of Judge Spano (joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku and Kalaydjieva) which 
derided the majority's 'attempt to reconcile norms of international law that are irreconcilable': at 59 [6] 
(emphasis in original).
25 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (Judgment) [2002] 
ICJ Rep 3, 86-7 [79] (Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal) ('Arrest Warrant Case').
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usinG thE human riGhts obLiGations of statEs as a mEans of 
CoLLatEraL EnforCEmEnt
Kadi v Council of the European Union
Mr Yassin Abdullah Kadi, a Saudi Arabian national, resident in Jeddah, was identified 
in the Security Council as a possible supporter of Al-Qaeda and, in October 2001, 
was placed by the Sanctions Committee on the list of individuals and entities whose 
assets were to be frozen. The first list of entities had been published in March 2001, 
and thereafter, the European Commission, complying with SC  Resolution  1267 
(1999),26 issued regulations that implemented the European Union's own measures 
against possible supporters of Al-Qaeda.27 These measures included a regulation with 
an amended annex of named supporters, including, amongst others, Mr Kadi, whose 
funds were to be frozen by the European Union (EU) and its member states.28 Mr 
Kadi filed an application with the Court of First Instance seeking an annulment of 
the regulations as they pertained to him, arguing that the regulations violated certain 
fundamental rights — right to a fair hearing, right to respect for property and of 
the principle of proportionality, and right to effective judicial review — which were 
guaranteed in the ECHR.29
Mr Kadi's argument, in essence, was that 'Community institutions cannot 
abdicate their responsibility to respect his fundamental rights by taking refuge behind 
26 SC  Res  1267 (1999), UN  SCOR, 55th  sess, 4051st  mtg, UN  Doc  S/RES/1267(1999) 
(15 October 1999).
27 Commission Regulation (EC)  No  2062/2001 of 19  October  2001, Amending, for the Third 
Time, Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001, Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods and Services 
to Afghanistan, Strengthening the Flight Ban and Extending the Freeze of Funds and Other Financial 
Resources in Respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan and Repealing Regulation (EC)  No  337/2000 
[2001] OJ L 227/25 ('Commission Regulation (EC) No 2062/2001 of 19 October 2001'); Council 
Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 of 6 March 2001, Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods and Services 
to Afghanistan, Strengthening the Flight Ban and Extending the Freeze of Funds and Other Financial 
Resources in Respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and Repealing Regulation (EC)  No  337/2000 
[2001] OJ J 67/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002, Imposing Certain Specific 
Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities Associated with Usama bin 
Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and Repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 
Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods and Services to Afghanistan, Strengthening the Flight Ban and 
Extending the Freeze of Funds and Other Financial resources in Respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan 
[2002] OJ L 139/9.
28 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2062/2001 of 19 October 2001 [2001] OJ L 227/25, 25.
29 Kadi v Council of the European Union (Court of First Instance of the European Union, Second 
Chamber, Extended Composition, 21 September 2005) [37]-[41], [59], [139] ('Kadi').
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decisions adopted by the Security Council'.30 The Council of the European Union and 
the Commission of the European Communities responded with a plea of Article 103:
Member States … have agreed to carry out without reservation the decisions 
taken in their name by the Security Council, in the higher interest of the 
maintenance of international peace and security … [O]bligations imposed on 
a Member of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter … prevail 
over every other international obligation to which the member might be 
subject. In that way Article 103 of the Charter makes it possible to disregard 
any other provision of international law … in order to apply the resolutions of 
the Security Council.31
The five judges of the Court of First Instance, handing down their judgment on 
21  September  2005, generally rejected Mr Kadi's arguments. The Court used 
Article 103 of the Charter as the basis for asserting that the obligations of EU members 
under the Charter 'clearly prevail over every other obligation of domestic law or of 
international treaty law' (including the ECHR)32 and, pointing to Article 25 of the 
Charter, argued that '[t]hat primacy extends to decisions contained in a resolution 
of the Security Council'.33 The Court expressly stated that 'Member States may, 
and indeed must, leave unapplied any provision of Community law … that raises 
any impediment to the proper performance of their obligations under the Charter 
of the United Nations'.34 Given these conclusions, the Court of First Instance 
declined to review the legality of the contested regulations, arguing that such review 
would amount to judicial review of the Security Council,35 and be forbidden by 
Article 103.36
Nonetheless, the Court also held that it had the capacity to engage in indirect 
judicial review of the implementation of Security Council resolutions vis-à-vis 
jus cogens,37 noting: 'The indirect judicial review carried out by the Court … may 
therefore, highly exceptionally, extend to determining whether the superior rules 












Although this step has been described as 'bold' and 'unexpected',39 it appears to be 
a simple recognition that, because the Charter cannot authorise conduct in breach 
of jus cogens, Article 103 cannot shield any such conduct from review.40 The Court 
found, however, on the facts that the disputed regulations did not violate Mr Kadi's 
jus cogens rights.41
Mr Kadi appealed to the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), which adopted a radically different approach to the Court 
of First Instance, giving no discernible weight to Article 103 of the Charter.42 Instead, 
the Grand Chamber emphasised its role of enforcing EU law irrespective of which 
Charter principles might be invoked. Indeed, the Grand Chamber's approach was 
(with one exception to be considered below) to consider the EC Treaty law in isolation 
and without reference to the Charter at all.43 Aust has gone so far as to state that the 
CJEU 'did not seem fully to appreciate that EU Member States are legally bound by 
Chapter VII resolutions'.44
The Grand Chamber reasoned that, because 'the Community is based on the 
rule of law  …  neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid review of 
the conformity of their acts with the basic constitutional charter, the EC Treaty'.45 
Referring repeatedly to the Charter as 'an international agreement', as if to deny it 
any special status,46 the Grand Chamber asserted that its role was unaffected by the 
Charter: 'an international agreement cannot affect … the autonomy of the Community 
39 Gráinne de Búrca, 'The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi' 
(2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 20.
40 See above n 18.
41 Kadi (CFI, Second Chamber, Extended Composition, 21 September 2005) [37]-[41], [59], [139] 
,[232]-[292]. See also Sara Poli and Maria Tzanou, 'The Kadi Rulings: A Survey of the Literature' (2009) 
28 Yearbook of European Law 533, 552-3. For an argument that there had been a breach of jus cogens, 
see Luis M Hinojosa Martínez, 'Bad Law for Good Reasons: The Contradictions of the Kadi Judgment' 
(2008) 5 International Organizations Law Review 339, 349-52.
42 The CJEU has been said to have proceeded by 'ignoring the international law elements pertinent 
to the case': Jan Klabbers, 'Book Review: Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council: 
Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions' (2011) 8 International Organizations Law Review 483, 484.
43 Treaty Establishing the European Community, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [1992] OJ C 
224/6 (entered into force 1 November 1993) ('EC Treaty').
44 Anthony Aust, 'Kadi: Ignoring International Legal Obligations' (2009) 6 International Organizations 
Law Review 293, 295.
45 Kadi v Council of the European Union (Court of Justice of the European Union, Grand Chamber, 
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, 3 September 2008) [281] ('Kadi').
46 A more orthodox description acknowledges 'the constitutional role of the UN  Charter in 




legal system'.47 The Grand Chamber expressly held that 'obligations imposed by an 
international agreement [that is, the Charter] cannot have the effect of prejudicing 
the constitutional principles of the EC  Treaty'.48 Indeed, according to the Grand 
Chamber, Article 103 was simply irrelevant to its task:
[I]t is not a consequence of the principles governing the international legal order 
under the United Nations that any judicial review of the internal lawfulness of 
the contested regulation … is excluded by virtue of the fact that that measure 
is intended to give effect to a resolution of the Security Council adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.49
Reasserting the autonomy of EC law, the Grand Chamber held that
review by the Court of the validity of any Community measure in the light of 
fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression, in a community 
based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the 
EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an 
international agreement.50
The Court again referred to its role within 'the internal and autonomous legal order 
of the Community'51 requiring it to
ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all 
Community acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part 
of the general principles of Community law, including review of Community 
measures which, like the contested regulation, are designed to give effect to the 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations.52
Thus, according to the Grand Chamber, no Charter principles required any 
deviation from the application of the full rigours of review by the CJEU of measures 
implementing the Security Council sanctions regime.
The Grand Chamber asserted, somewhat unpersuasively, that such review of 
Community acts was not relevant to the Charter: 'the review of lawfulness … by 
the Community judicature applies to the Community act intended to give effect 
to the international agreement at issue, and not to the latter as such'.53 The Court 
declared, emphasising the separation between EU law and that of the Charter, that 
'any judgment given by the Community judicature deciding that a Community 
47 Kadi (CJEU, Grand Chamber, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, 3 September 2008) [282] (emphasis added).
48 Ibid [285] (emphasis added).
49 Ibid [299].
50 Ibid [316] (emphasis added).
51 Ibid [317].




measure … is contrary to a higher rule of law in the Community legal order would 
not entail any challenge to the primacy of that resolution in international law'.54
These claims, however, assert a distinction between European and international 
law which cannot be accepted in full.55 As Aust observed, 'this was correct only in 
a formal sense. But, its effect is that EU  Member States may now have to act in 
conformity with EU law as laid down by the ECJ even if it conflicts with their legal 
obligations under a Chapter  VII resolution'.56 Indeed, Martínez's criticism of the 
CJEU in Kadi referred to 'the artificiality of its dualist discourse',57 explaining that 
'when the European Regulation simply applies the SC decision with no margin of 
discretion, the frontier between both norms disappears, and the judicial review of one 
entails the parallel evaluation of the other'.58 In such a case, as Cuyvers has noted, 
'UN primacy sits uneasily with any judicial review at the EU or national level'.59 
Perhaps implicitly recognising this, the Grand Chamber attempted to establish a 
leeway within the international sphere to accommodate the European requirements:
[T]he Charter … does not impose the choice of a particular model for the 
implementation of resolutions adopted by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, since they are to be given effect in accordance 
with the procedure applicable in that respect in the domestic legal order of 
each Member of the United Nations. The Charter  …  leaves the Members 
of the United Nations a free choice among the various possible models for 
transposition of those resolutions into their domestic legal order.60
Wherever such leeway might arise, it certainly is not obvious in Articles 25 or 103 of 
the Charter.61
By asserting the autonomy of the EU legal system in unequivocal terms, and 
thereby adopting a dualist approach to the relationship between international law 
54 Ibid [288].
55 See, for example, Miša Zgonec-Rošej, 'Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P' (2009) 103 American 
Journal of International Law 305, 311: 'While the judgment does not compromise the primacy of the 
relevant Security Council resolutions on the international plane, it affects their implementation at the 
EC and domestic levels'.
56 Aust, 'Kadi', above n 44, 297.
57 Martínez, above n 41, 341.
58 Ibid 342; cf Jean d'Aspremont and Frédéric Dogagne, 'Kadi: The ECJ's Reminder of the Elementary 
Divide Between Legal Orders' (2008) 5 International Organizations Law Review 371, 371-2, 374-8.
59 Armin Cuyvers, 'The Kadi  II Judgment of the General Court: The ECJ's Predicament and the 
Consequences for Member States' (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 481, 483.
60 Kadi (CJEU, Grand Chamber, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, 3 September 2008) [298].
61 This is also not the sort of leeway that was found in the particular Resolution  in question in 
Al‑Jedda (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application No 27021/08, 7 July 2011): see above n 11.
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and EU  law, the Grand Chamber might be seen to have sidestepped the issue of 
the primacy of Article 103 of the Charter.62 In fact, however, the significance of the 
decision in Kadi is unmistakable: decisions of the Security Council which member 
states are required under Article  25 to carry out, and which in theory enjoy the 
primacy given to Charter obligations under Article 103, are nonetheless vulnerable 
to collateral attack through regional judicial institutions on the basis of human rights 
obligations.
In its application of the law to the facts, the Grand Chamber made at least 
some concessions. Although the Court had referred to 'in principle … full review',63 
in fact it allowed some measure of latitude in the implementation of ECHR standards 
(although this was less a concession to the Charter than to security concerns). Thus, 
the Grand Chamber accepted that
with regard to a Community measure intended to give effect to a resolution 
adopted by the Security Council in connection with the fight against terrorism, 
overriding considerations to do with safety or the conduct of the international 
relations of the Community and of its Member States may militate against the 
communication of certain matters to the persons concerned and, therefore, 
against their being heard on those matters.64
Nonetheless, the Grand Chamber cautioned that 'that does not mean … that restrictive 
measures … escape all review by the Community judicature once it has been claimed 
that the act laying them down concerns national security and terrorism'.65 Instead, 
the Court proposed some balancing — albeit not of Charter considerations against 
EU law, but of security concerns against human rights — through the use of
techniques which accommodate, on the one hand, legitimate security concerns 
about the nature and sources of information taken into account in the adoption 
of the act concerned and, on the other, the need to accord the individual a 
sufficient measure of procedural justice.66
62 See, for example, de Búrca, above n 39, 22-6, 29, 40-9; Christian Tomuschat, 'The Kadi Case: What 
Relationship is There Between the Universal Legal Order Under the Auspices of the United Nations and 
the EU Legal Order?' (2009) 28 Yearbook of European Law 654, 657-60; Katja S Ziegler, 'Strengthening 
the Rule of Law, but Fragmenting International Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ from the Perspective 
of Human Rights' (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 288, 293-8. Cf Piet Eeckhout, 'Kadi and Al 
Barakaat: Luxembourg is not Texas — or Washington DC' on EJIL: Talk! (25 February 2009) <http://
www.ejiltalk.org/kadi-and-al-barakaat-luxembourg-is-not-texas-or-washington-dc/>.
63 A point emphasised in Koen Lenaerts, 'The Kadi Saga and the Rule of Law Within the EU' (2014) 
67 Southern Methodist University Law Review 707, 715.





Even adopting such techniques and permitting, for example, actions to be 
taken without prior notice to affected individuals (so long as subsequent options for 
challenging a decision were available to them), the Court nonetheless found violations 
of rights to make a defence, to effective legal remedies, and to be free from arbitrary 
deprivation of property.67 The Court therefore annulled the relevant regulations.68
Thus the Grand Chamber in Kadi departed significantly from the Court of 
First Instance. In place of an application of Article 103 to shield from judicial review 
actions implementing Security Council Resolutions (except in the case of violations 
of jus cogens), the Grand Chamber largely ignored the Charter and instead repeatedly 
emphasised the autonomy of European law, calling into question the special status of 
the Charter. The polarity of these two approaches led Hilpold to observe that Kadi 
is 'a leading case in the EU judicial system without furnishing — in itself — definite 
hints for the solution of the underlying problems'.69 Kadi raises but does not answer 
many questions of interest to international lawyers.
The significance of Kadi is in its demonstration that the effective powers of the 
Security Council on a broad reading of Articles 25 and 103 may be subject to powerful 
collateral limits. These limits can be brought to bear through legal attacks on actions 
implementing Security Council Resolutions brought on the basis of rules contained 
in other spheres of international, regional or municipal law (in this case human rights 
law). This situation results from the Grand Chamber of the CJEU insisting on the 
autonomous application of the EC Treaty to the exclusion of the Charter, without 
any attempt at harmonisation or acceptance of any status of lex superior.
Sayadi v Belgium 
Sayadi v Belgium70 concerned an individual communication to the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) alleging violations by Belgium of rights under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) enjoyed by Mr Nabil Sayadi and 
67 Ibid [348], [349], [370].
68 Ibid [372].
69 Peter Hilpold, 'EU and UN Law in Conflict: The Kadi Case' (2009) 13 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 141, 142.
70 Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication  No  1472/2006, 94th  sess, UN  Doc  CCPR/
C/94/D/1472/2006 (29  December  2008) annex ('Views of the Human Rights Committee Under 
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights') 
('Sayadi'). For a summary of the case, see Annalisa Ciampi, 'Security Council Targeted Sanctions and 
Human Rights' in Bardo Fassbender (ed), Securing Human Rights? Achievements and Challenges of the 
UN Security Council (Oxford University Press, 2011) 98, 123-7. For an extended critique, see Marko 
Milanović, 'The Human Rights Committee's Views in Sayadi v Belgium: A Missed Opportunity' (2009) 
1 Goettingen Journal of International Law 519, 519-38.
76
IMAGINING LAW
Ms Patricia Vinck, married Belgian nationals residing in Belgium.71 The authors of 
the communication had been placed on the Sanctions Committee's list of possible 
supporters of Al-Qaeda when the Belgian Government, on 19  November  2002, 
informed the Committee that Mr Sayadi and Ms Vinck 'were, respectively, the 
director and secretary of Fondation Secours International, reportedly the European 
branch of the Global Relief Foundation, an American association that has been on 
the sanctions list since 22 October 2002'.72 Subsequently, and while Mr Sayadi and 
Ms Vinck were not charged with an offence, EU and Belgian legislation froze their 
assets and banned them from travelling internationally.73 In 2005, Mr Sayadi and Ms 
Vinck sought, and were granted, an order from the Brussels Court of First Instance 
requiring the Belgian Government 'to initiate the procedure to have their names 
removed from the Sanctions Committee's list';74 however, the Committee refused to 
delist the applicants.75
At issue in Sayadi was both the admissibility of the applicants' communication 
to the HRC, and their substantive claims of violations of, inter alia, rights to freedom 
of movement under the ICCPR through Belgium's implementation of the 1267 
Sanctions regime.76
The HRC concluded that the communication was admissible under Article 1 
of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.77 In its reasons at the admissibility stage 
handed down on 30 March 2007, the HRC rejected an argument that it was not 
competent to rule on implementations of Security Council Resolutions. The HRC 
emphasised the autonomy of its role (much as the Grand Chamber of the CJEU would 
do in Kadi the following year), explaining:
While the Committee could not consider alleged violations of other instruments 
such as the Charter of the United Nations … the Committee was competent 
to admit a communication alleging that a State party had violated rights set 
forth in the Covenant, regardless of the source of the obligations implemented 
by the State party.78
In its reasons at the merits stage handed down on 22  October  2008, the HRC 
examined Article  46 of the ICCPR, which relevantly provides: 'Nothing in the 
71 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16  December  1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) ('ICCPR').
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present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations'. However, as the Grand Chamber of the CJEU had done one 
month before in Kadi, the HRC emphasised the autonomy of its role, stating that
there is nothing in this case that involves interpreting a provision of the 
Covenant as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
The case concerns the compatibility with the Covenant of national measures taken 
by the State party in implementation of a Security Council resolution.79
The HRC therefore proceeded to examine whether Belgium had violated the ICCPR 
when it complied with its Charter obligations to enforce the relevant Security Council 
Resolutions. Although the parties had referred to Article 103 of the Charter, in its 
merits decision the HRC did not expressly take that provision into account. Indeed, 
the HRC did not take into account Belgium's Charter obligations at all.
The HRC found that Belgium had breached the authors' right to freedom of 
movement in Article 12 of the ICCPR, because the restrictions imposed were not 
'necessary to protect national security'. The HRC noted that Belgium had originally 
submitted the authors' names to the Sanctions Committee.80 It further noted that, 
after the termination of a criminal investigation with no adverse findings against the 
authors, Belgium had submitted two delisting requests in respect of the authors.81 
This was not enough to satisfy the HRC, which relied on the outcome of the criminal 
investigation and the delisting requests to prove that the original submission of 
names, and enforcement of the Security Council Resolutions in the interim, were in 
breach of Article 12.82 No allowance was made for Belgium's Charter obligations in 
the HRC's reasoning regarding Article 12.83
In finding a breach of the Article 17 right not to be subjected to unlawful attacks 
on the authors' honour and reputation (through their appearance on published lists 
of sanctions targets), the HRC again ignored Belgium's Charter obligations.84 Placing 
no weight on Belgium's claim that it was obliged to transmit the authors' names to 
the Sanctions Committee (whilst not disputing the accuracy of that claim), the HRC 
79 Ibid 22 [10.3] (emphasis added).
80 Ibid 23-4 [10.7].
81 Ibid 24 [10.8].
82 Ibid  23-4 [10.7]-[10.8]. Milanović has heavily criticised the approach here: 'This is not 
reasoning, not even result oriented jurisprudence — this is simply the Human Rights Committee's 
wishful thinking'. Marko Milanović, 'Sayadi: The Human Rights Committee's Kadi (or a 
pretty poor excuse for one  …)' on EJIL:  Talk! (29  January  2009) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/
sayadi-the-human-rights-committee%E2%80%99s-kadi-or-a-pretty-poor-excuse-for-one>.
83 Contrary to the authors' submissions, on the facts the HRC found no breach of arts 14 or 15, again 





found a violation of Article 17 as 'even though the State party is not competent to 
remove the authors' names … it is responsible for the presence of the authors' names 
on those lists'.85
The HRC in Sayadi thus pursued a similar approach to Kadi, in that Belgium's 
Charter obligations were ignored, Article 103 was given no weight, and instead the 
ICCPR was applied without modification or harmonisation. There were, however, 
a significant number of individual opinions, some strongly dissenting from the 
approach of the majority of the HRC.
Sir Nigel Rodley, Ivan Shearer and Iulia Antoanella Motoc dissented on the 
issue of jurisdiction, stating that
the State party has done what it could to secure the authors' de-listing. In 
so doing it has provided the only remedy within its power …  [U]nless the 
Committee believes that the State party's mere compliance with the Security 
Council listing procedure … is capable of itself of violating the Covenant, it is 
not clear how the authors can still be considered victims … of violations of the 
State party's obligations.86
To similar effect was the dissenting opinion of Ruth Wedgwood. She first expressed 
the view that the allegations were not really against Belgium at all, but against the 
Security Council:
The complaint … is inadmissible because it pleads no cognizable violation by 
the State party.
The authors are complaining about the actions and decisions of the United 
Nations Security Council, not the acts of Belgium.87
Second, Wedgwood referred to Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, relying on these 
as excluding the jurisdiction of the HRC:
The Committee is not entitled to use the hollow form of a pleading against a 
State to rewrite those provisions … [I]t has no appellate jurisdiction to review 
decisions of the Security Council. Neither can it penalize a State for complying 
with those decisions. It would be inconsistent with the constitutional structure 
of the United Nations Charter, and its own responsibilities under the 
Covenant.88
Ivan Shearer's dissenting opinion on the merits took a similar approach. 
Expressly applying Articles  25 and  103 of the Charter, Shearer noted that '[t]he 
Committee's reasoning … appears to regard the Covenant as on a par with the United 
85 Ibid 26 [10.13].
86 Ibid, app A, 27 (Sir Nigel Rodley, Ivan Shearer and Iulia Antoanella Motoc).
87 Ibid app A, 29 (Ruth Wedgwood).
88 Ibid, app A, 30.
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Nations Charter, and as not subordinate to it'.89 Instead, Shearer stated (drawing an 
analogy to the application of the lex specialis maxim to determine the co-application 
of human rights and humanitarian law):90 'Human rights law must be accommodated 
within, and harmonized with, the law of the Charter'.91 However, it was lex superior, 
rather than harmonisation, that Shearer applied in his conclusion that 'the State party 
acted in good faith to discharge its obligations under a superior law. There can be no 
violation of the Covenant in these circumstances'.92
In these dissenting opinions, Charter provisions were applied to the exclusion 
of the ICCPR (an approach that had been taken by the Swiss Federal Court in Nada, 
as detailed below, and Court of First Instance in Kadi, but not by the CJEU). One 
interesting feature of the HRC opinions is the lack of a middle ground. No attempt 
at harmonisation was made; members adopted polar positions. Perhaps, therefore, 
Sayadi was the HRC's Kadi. Of course, one vital difference is that there is no 
immediate consequence of a finding by the HRC that Belgium had violated the 
authors' rights under the ICCPR, unlike within the European system where decisions 
of the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) are likely to be 
enforced or carried out.93
Nada v Switzerland
Mr Youssef Nada, an elderly Italian/Egyptian national living in a small Italian 
enclave, Campione d'Italia, within Switzerland, was severely impacted by Swiss 
implementation of the transit ban required by SC Resolution 1390 (2002) in respect 
of individuals (including Mr Nada) listed pursuant to SC Resolutions 1267 (1999) 
and 1333 (2000).94 Mr Nada had unsuccessfully applied to the Focal Point for 
Delisting established under SC  Resolution  1730 (2006) to be removed from the 
89 Ibid, app B, 32 (Ivan Shearer).
90 See, for example, Roberta Arnold and Noëlle Quénivet (eds), International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008); Samaneh 
Hassanli, A Proposal for the Implementation of Human Rights Treaty Obligations in Armed Conflict 
(PhD Thesis, University of Adelaide, 2014) [a thesis I was privileged to co-supervise under Professor 
Gardam's guidance]; Marko Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, 
Principles, and Policy (Oxford University Press, 2011).
91 Sayadi, UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, 32 (Ivan Shearer) (emphasis added).
92 Ibid 33 (emphasis added).
93 See, for example, Milanović, 'A Missed Opportunity', above n 70, 536-7.
94 SC  Res  1267 (1999), UN  SCOR, 55th  sess, 4051st  mtg, UN  Doc  S/RES/1267(1999) 
(15 October 1999); SC Res 1333 (2000), UN SCOR, 56th sess, 4251st mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1333(2000) 




list.95 His case before the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR alleged violations of his 
right to liberty and right to respect for private and family life (during the period from 
2003, when he was first refused passage through Switzerland, to 2009, when he was 
delisted and again allowed to transit through Switzerland).96 Resolution of Mr Nada's 
claims necessarily required the Court to reconcile Switzerland's obligations under the 
ECHR with its obligations under the Charter.
Before the Swiss authorities, Mr Nada argued that 'the Security Council's 
sanctions were contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the peremptory norms 
of international law (jus cogens)' and that accordingly 'Switzerland was not obliged 
to implement them'.97 The Swiss Federal Court, handing down its decision on 
14 November 2007, disagreed.98 The Court accepted that 'the delisting procedure 
fails to meet both the requirement of access to a court … and that of an effective 
remedy'.99 Nonetheless, the Federal Court noted the obligation on Switzerland as a 
member state to carry out the decisions of the Security Council under Article 25 of 
the Charter, and the primacy of Charter obligations under Article 103.100 The Court 
concluded that only breach of a jus cogens obligation would justify a state failing to 
fulfil its Charter obligations,101 that Mr Nada's affected rights did not enjoy the status 
of jus cogens,102 and thus that Mr Nada's claim must fail because the sanctions regime 
allowed 'member States no margin of appreciation in their implementation'.103
Mr Nada appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. Handing down 
its decision on 12 September 2012, the Grand Chamber noted that Article 30(1) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifically excepts Article 103 of the 
Charter from its general rules regulating the application of successive treaties relating 
95 SC  Res  1730 (2006), UN  SCOR, 62nd  sess, 5599th  mtg, UN  Doc  S/RES/1730 (2006) 
(19 December 2006).
96 Nada v Switzerland (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 10593/08, 
12 September 2012) 1 [3], 37-8 [126]-[128] ('Nada').
97 Ibid 7 [38].
98 For an English summary, see Nada v State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (2007) ILDC 461.
99 Nada  v  State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (Swiss Federal Court, 14  November  2007) 
[8.3] ('Nada  v  SSEA'), quoted in Nada (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application  No  10593/08, 
12 September 2012) 10 [50].
100 See the discussion of the Federal Court judgment in Nada (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 
Application No 10593/08, 12 September 2012) 8 [42].
101 Ibid 9 [46].
102 Ibid 9 [47].
103 Nada v SSEA (Swiss Federal Court, 14 November 2007) [8.1], quoted in Nada (ECtHR, Grand 
Chamber, Application No 10593/08, 12 September 2012) 10 [50].
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to the same subject matter.104 The Grand Chamber also quoted from Fragmentation 
of International Law: '
Article 103 does not say that the Charter prevails, but refers to obligations under 
the Charter … [T]his also covers duties based on binding decisions by United 
Nations bodies [including] … resolutions of the Security Council that have 
been adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.105
Observing that '[t]wo diverging commitments must … be harmonised as far 
as possible',106 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR contemplated the application of a 
presumption that '[i]n the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a Security Council 
Resolution, the Court must therefore choose the interpretation which is most in 
harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict 
of obligations'.107 The Court confirmed this interpretive principle, but whereas in its 
earlier decision in Al‑Jedda the failure to specify a consequence of interment without 
trial had left room for its application, in Nada the relevant SC  Resolutions were 
explicit.108
The critical step in the Grand Chamber's reasoning was its finding that 
Switzerland's obligations under the ECHR could be reconciled with its obligations 
under the Charter because 'Switzerland enjoyed some latitude, which was admittedly 
limited but nevertheless real, in implementing the relevant binding resolutions of the 
UN Security Council'.109 This finding was possible only because the Grand Chamber 
adopted a loose interpretation of the relevant Charter obligations. First, the Court 
argued that
the United Nations Charter does not impose on States a particular model for 
the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII. Without prejudice to the binding nature of such resolutions, the 
Charter in principle leaves to UN member States a free choice among the various 
possible models for transposition of those resolutions into their domestic legal 
order. The Charter thus imposes on States an obligation of result, leaving them 
to choose the means by which they give effect to the resolutions.110
104 Nada (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application No 10593/08, 12 September 2012) 25 [80].
105 Fragmentation of International Law, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 168-9 [331] (emphasis in original), 
quoted in Nada (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application No 10593/08, 12 September 2012) 26 [81].
106 Nada (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application No 10593/08, 12 September 2012) 46 [170].
107 Ibid  46 [171], quoting Al‑Jedda (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application  No  27021/08, 
7 July 2011) 57 [102].





Second, the Grand Chamber relied on the text of SC Resolution 1390 (2002) as 
allowing leeway, both in the exception to the travel ban in Paragraph  2(b) where 
'necessary for the fulfillment of a judicial process'111 and in Paragraph  8, which 
referred to the taking of 'immediate steps to enforce and strengthen through legislative 
enactments or administrative measures, where appropriate, the measures imposed 
under domestic laws or regulations'.112
The Court therefore concluded that Switzerland had failed to take advantage 
of 'the possibility of deciding how the relevant Security Council resolutions were 
to be implemented in the domestic legal order' to achieve 'some alleviation of the 
sanctions regime applicable to the applicant … without however circumventing the 
binding nature of the relevant resolutions or compliance with the sanctions provided 
for therein'.113
Formally, in reaching its conclusions regarding Article 8 of the ECHR, the 
Court did not address the question of primacy:
That finding dispenses the Court from determining the question  …  of the 
hierarchy between the obligations of the States Parties to the Convention … and 
those arising from the United Nations Charter … [T]he important point is 
that the respondent Government have failed to show that they attempted, as 
far as possible, to harmonise the obligations that they regarded as divergent.114
The significance of the Grand Chamber's decision lies in its attempt to achieve 
harmonisation of Switzerland's obligations under the Charter and the ECHR. Its 
actual reasoning, finding that Switzerland enjoyed a measure of latitude in how it 
implemented the relevant Security Council Resolutions, might well be questioned 
(and, indeed, was by some judges — a matter considered below), but it is the attempt 
to achieve harmonisation between the two relevant legal regimes that puts Nada 
in a different position to Kadi.115 Notwithstanding this attempt at harmonisation, 
however, the end result remained the same — implementation of the relevant Security 
Council Resolution by the member state was limited by a regional court on the basis 
of the state's human rights obligations.
Two concurring opinions are worth noting. Judges Bratza, Nicolaou and 
Yudviska expressed 'considerable doubts' about the conclusion that Switzerland 





115 One commentator called the reasoning 'milder' than Kadi: Solène Guggisberg, 'The Nada Case 
Before the ECtHR: A New Milestone in the European Debate on Security Council Targeted Sanctions 
and Human Rights Obligations' (2012) 8 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 411, 428.
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instead holding that 'the obligation imposed … was a binding one which … allowed 
no flexibility or discretion to the States as to whether to give full effect to the sanctions 
imposed'.116 Nonetheless, even for these judges, Switzerland had failed 'to take such 
steps as were open to them to mitigate the effects of the measures' implementing the 
Security Council Resolution.117
Similarly, Judge Malinverni held that 'it is difficult … to sustain the argument 
that Switzerland had any room for manoeuvre in the present case'.118 However, the 
judge also found human rights obligations relevant to the Security Council, asking 
of Articles 25 and 103 'do those two Charter provisions actually give the Security 
Council carte blanche? That is far from certain'. Instead, referring to Article 24(2) 
requiring the Security Council to 'act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles 
of the United Nations' and Article 1(3) as establishing one of those purposes to be 
'respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms', Judge Malinverni stated 
that '[o]ne does not need to be a genius to conclude from this that the Security 
Council itself must also respect human rights'.119
These provisions of the Charter thus gave Judge Malinverni an opening to 
harmonise Switzerland's Charter obligations and human rights obligations in 
a manner favourable to human rights. The judge also took inspiration from Kadi 
and Sayadi,120 asking 'should the Court, as guarantor of respect for human rights in 
Europe, not be more audacious than the European Court of Justice or the Human 
Rights Committee'?121 The judge criticised any broad application of Article 103 as 
liable to upset 'the balance that States should strike between the requirements of 
collective security and respect for fundamental rights, since it means that rights will 
be sacrificed for the sake of security'.122
These concurring opinions demonstrate that, even to the extent that some 
judges recognised the limited leeway available to states in the implementation of 
Security Council Resolutions, there remained nonetheless, through the process of 
116 Nada (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application  No  10593/08, 12  September  2012) 66 [5] 
(Judges Bratza, Nicolaou and Yudviska). See also Nada at 65 [1], 67 [8] (Judges Bratza, Nicolaou 
and Yudviska). Similarly: 'looking at the text of the relevant UNSC resolution this argument is not 
entirely convincing': Auke Willems, 'The European Court of Human Rights on the UN  Individual 
Counter-Terrorist Sanctions Regime: Safeguarding Convention Rights and Harmonising Conflicting 
Norms in Nada v Switzerland' (2014) 83 Nordic Journal of International Law 39, 56.
117 Nada (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application No 10593/08, 12 September 2012) 67 [9] (Judges 
Bratza, Nicolaou and Yudviska).







harmonisation, a requirement to offer procedural and substantive safeguards where 
those were lacking in the United Nations system. Again, harmonisation seemed to 
water down the significance of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, and was held to 
require member states to take steps to remedy human rights problems in the manner 
of their implementation of Security Council Resolutions if the Security Council had 
not itself responded to its own dictate to observe human rights. While Nada was 
undoubtedly more nuanced than Kadi in its insistence on a harmonisation of human 
rights obligations and Charter imperatives, the result reached in the case demonstrates 
the extent to which even harmonisation can marginalise Article 103 of the Charter.
Kadi II 
Following Kadi, the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee released to France and 
thence to the European Commission and Mr Kadi a 'narrative summary of the reasons' 
for Mr Kadi's listing.123 Mr Kadi was given an opportunity by the Commission to 
respond, before the Commission adopted a new regulation re-imposing sanctions on 
Mr Kadi.124 Mr Kadi challenged that new regulation on similar grounds to his initial 
challenge.
The three judges of the General Court, handing down their decision in Kadi II 
on 30 September 2010, noted the argument that, if Kadi were followed, the CJEU's 
'judicial review is liable to encroach on the Security Council's prerogatives'.125 It also 
noted that
certain doubts may have been voiced in legal circles as to whether the judgment 
of the Court of Justice in Kadi is wholly consistent with, on the one hand, 
international law and, more particularly, Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter of 
the United Nations and, on the other hand, the EC and EU Treaties.126
The General Court in Kadi II also observed that in Kadi
the Court of Justice … seems to have regarded the constitutional framework 
created by the EC Treaty as a wholly autonomous legal order, not subject to 
the higher rules of international law — in this case the law deriving from the 
Charter of the United Nations.127
123 Kadi v European Commission (Court of Justice of the European Union, General Court, Seventh 
Chamber, T-85/09, 30 September 2010) [27] ('Kadi II').
124 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1190/2008 of 28 November 2008, Amending for the 101st time 
Council Regulation (EC)  No  881/2002 Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Measures Directed 
Against Certain Persons and Entities Associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the 
Taliban [2008] OJ L 322/25.





The General Court in Kadi II went so far as to state that 'those criticisms are not 
entirely without foundation'.128 As Cuyvers has noted, these observations by the 
General Court in Kadi II amount to a 'candid and fundamental criticism' of Kadi.129 
Nonetheless, the General Court in Kadi II, although noting that it was not bound 
by the decision of the Grand Chamber in Kadi,130 decided to defer to that decision.131 
It therefore undertook the 'full review'132 mandated by Kadi, and unsurprisingly 
reached the same conclusion that the sanctions measures were invalid. The General 
Court held that 'the re-examination procedure operated by the Sanctions Committee 
clearly fails to offer guarantees of effective judicial protection'.133 Discounting the 
significance of the focal point for delisting and the Office of the Ombudsperson,134 
the General Court catalogued some of the human rights difficulties with the Security 
Council's sanctions regime:
[T]he Security Council has still not deemed it appropriate to establish 
an independent and impartial body responsible for hearing and 
determining  …  actions against individual decisions taken by the Sanctions 
Committee  …  [R]emoval of a person from the Sanctions Committee's list 
requires consensus within the committee  …  [T]here is no mechanism to 
ensure that sufficient information be made available to the person concerned 
in order to allow him to defend himself effectively … For those reasons at least, 
the creation of the focal point and the Office of the Ombudsperson cannot 
be equated with the provision of an effective judicial procedure for review of 
decisions of the Sanctions Committee.135
The General Court therefore held that the process leading to the making of the 
contested regulation did not satisfy the requirements of the ECHR, and annulled the 
128 Ibid [121].
129 Cuyvers, above n 59, 488.




134 See, for example, Erica de  Wet, 'From Kadi to Nada: Judicial Techniques Favouring Human 
Rights over United Nations Security Council Sanctions' (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 
787, 789 [3] (references deleted):
The most meaningful qualitative improvement from the perspective of listed individuals and entities has 
been the introduction of the Ombudsperson through UNSC Resolution 1904 (2009), who replaced the 
Focal Point in relation to the Al Qaida sanctions committee … However, despite the undisputed relief 
that her conscientious efforts have brought to those de-listed, the ultimate decision for de-listing remains 
a political one in the hands of the sanctions committee and the UNSC.
135 Kadi (CJEU, General Court, Seventh Chamber, T-85/09, 30 September 2010) [128].
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regulation.136 This decision was challenged, ultimately, by the European Commission, 
the Council of the European Union and no less than fourteen EU member states.137
Delivering its judgment on the appeal on 18 July 2013, the Grand Chamber 
dealt remarkably briefly with the arguments regarding the clash between ECHR and 
Charter obligations. The Grand Chamber in Kadi II stated that Kadi was based on
the constitutional guarantee which is exercised, in a Union based on the rule 
of law … by judicial review of the lawfulness of all European Union measures, 
including those which, as in the present case, implement an international law 
measure, in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European 
Union.138
The Grand Chamber in Kadi II simply indicated 'there has been no change in those 
factors which could justify reconsideration of that position'.139
The Grand Chamber's reasons made clear how onerous the 'full review' it 
demanded in order to meet the ECHR obligations would be.140 Very few, if any, 
concessions were made to peace and security imperatives or Charter obligations.141 
Although the Grand Chamber rejected the General Court's approach to some ECHR 
issues,142 it nonetheless concluded that the regulation was correctly annulled, because
136 Ibid [188].
137 United Kingdom, Republic of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, 
Kingdom of Spain, French Republic, Italian Republic, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Hungary, 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Republic of Austria, Slovak Republic and Republic of Finland. See 
European Commission v Kadi (Court of Justice of the European Union, Grand Chamber, C-584/10 P, 




141 This is not to say that the CJEU's review was stricter than the General Court's, but to emphasise 
the strictness of the CJEU's review itself. It has been observed that the CJEU 'sought to reiterate the 
principles upon which the General Court's judgment was based, albeit tempering its conclusions with 
a measure of practicality and deference to the complexities of foreign relations': Harley J Hooper, 'An 
Unsteady Middle Ground: Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission and 
United Kingdom v Yassin Abdullah Kadi (No 2) [2013] ECR 00000 (18 July 2013)' (2014) 20 European 
Public Law 409, 414. Nonetheless, as de Wet observes, the CJEU applied a 'high level of scrutiny': 
de Wet, above n 134, 791 [10]. Similarly, van den Herik underscores the CJEU's 'high standard of 
judicial review': Larissa J van den Herik, 'Peripheral Hegemony in the Quest to Ensure Security Council 
Accountability for its Individualized UN Sanctions Regimes' (2014) 19 Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law 427, 447. Feinäugle describes the CJEU's review as 'a praiseworthy continuation of badly needed 
human rights protection in the sanctions context': Clemens A Feinäugle, 'Commission v Kadi' (2013) 
107 American Journal of International Law 878, 882.




none of the allegations presented against Mr Kadi in the summary provided 
by the Sanctions Committee are such as to justify the adoption, at European 
Union level, of restrictive measures against him, either because the statement 
of reasons is insufficient, or because information or evidence which might 
substantiate the reason concerned, in the face of detailed rebuttals submitted 
by the party concerned, is lacking.143
Although the Grand Chamber sought to draw support from the result in Nada,144 
in fact the reasoning underlying Kadi  II is quite different. Notwithstanding the 
arguments of the European Union institutions and fourteen member states (and the 
views of the General Court), in Kadi II the thirteen judges of the Grand Chamber 
of the CJEU once again treated EU law as autonomous, and applied it without any 
expressed or evident attempt at harmonisation with the law of the Charter.
Al‑Dulimi v Switzerland
Less than two months after the decision of the CJEU in Kadi II, the Second Section 
of the ECtHR handed down its decision in Al‑Dulimi v Switzerland.145 Mr Khalaf 
M Al-Dulimi, a resident of Jordan, is alleged to have been the head of finance for 
Saddam Hussein's Iraqi secret service. His assets, and those of a company of which 
he was formerly the managing director (Montana Management Inc), were frozen by 
Switzerland from 7 August 1990, implementing SC Resolution 661,146 and became 
liable to confiscation by Switzerland from 18 May 2004 in its implementation of 
the listing of Mr Al-Dulimi and the company by the 1518 Sanctions Committee.147 
Mr Al-Dulimi's challenges, both to the Swiss measures implementing the sanctions 
before the Swiss Federal Court148 and to his listing by the Sanctions Committee 
through an application to the Focal Point for Delisting,149 were unsuccessful. His 
argument was that Switzerland had breached his right of access to a court under 
Article 6 of the ECHR.
The judges of the Court agreed that Nada could be distinguished on the 
basis that the discretion to implement that was (perhaps unconvincingly) asserted 
143 Ibid [163]. See also [141], [151]-[162].
144 Ibid [133].
145 Al‑Dulimi  v  Switzerland (European Court of Human Rights, Second Section, 
Application No 5809/08, 27 November 2013 ('Al‑Dulimi').
146 SC Res 661 (1990), UN SCOR, 45th sess, 2933rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/661(1990) (6 August 1990).
147 Al‑Dulimi [3]-[31].




there did not exist in Al‑Dulimi.150 The majority professed to apply harmonisation, 
stating that the ECHR 'cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must be interpreted 
in harmony with the general principles of international law'.151 However, the judges 
referred to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but 
then identified the relevant body of law for this purpose (in addition to the ECHR) 
as being 'the rules concerning the international protection of human rights',152 and 
not the Charter. Moreover, there was no attempt to harmonise Charter obligations. 
Instead, the majority stated that
where the relevant organisation protects fundamental rights in a manner 
which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention 
provides … the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the 
requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal 
obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation.153
In other words, if the sanctions regime met ECHR standards (the 'equivalent 
protection' test), the Court would presume that the ECHR was not violated when a 
state implemented those sanctions. It was not argued that the sanctions regime did 
meet ECHR standards, so a finding that Switzerland had breached its obligations was 
inevitable.154 This judgment applied pure autonomy, as it did not take the Charter 
into account at all when examining the standard that must be met by a state in order 
to meet its ECHR obligations.
The dissenting judgment of Judge Lorenzen, joined by Judges Raimondi and 
Jočiené, indicated that, on the facts, the 'conflict between obligations under the 
United Nations Charter and under the Convention could only be solved by giving 
one of them priority'.155 The dissenting judges would have resolved the issue of 
priority by applying the lex superior: 'in case of a conflict between the obligations 
under Article 103 of the Charter and obligations under the Convention, States parties 
to both legal instruments are bound to give the Charter obligations priority'.156
Unlike Nada, there was no attempt at harmonisation in Al‑Dulimi. Instead, 
four judges applied autonomy, and three applied lex specialis. An appeal to the Grand 
Chamber was heard on 10  December  2014; judgment was delivered on 21 June 










thE ConsEquEnCEs of CurrEnt PraCtiCE and issuEs for thE futurE
Current practice in the use of the human rights obligations of states as a collateral 
limit on the powers of the Security Council has some important consequences, and 
leaves unresolved some significant issues for the future. This section reflects on the 
present state of the jurisprudence, and the underlying conceptual approaches at 
play in existing decisions. It then considers these decisions in the broader context 
of the idea of an equilibrium in the international legal order, and notes the impact 
on these decisions of the Security Council's intransigence about how its sanctions 
regimes impact human rights. Next, the most significant limitation on the practice 
examined in this chapter is considered. Whatever might be the merits of the nascent 
European constitutionalism on display in Kadi and Kadi II for EU members, in order 
to influence international law, the new (weakened) understanding of Article 103 of 
the Charter will have to be reflected in general state practice if it is to impact on the 
Charter's application as a matter of international (and not European) law. Finally, the 
chapter considers whether Article 103 is, in fact, dead.
A Fractured Jurisprudence
Kadi, Sayadi, Nada, Kadi II and Al‑Dulimi all resulted in findings that human rights 
obligations had been breached in the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 
imposing targeted sanctions, even under the improved procedures now prevailing 
with the Security Council having established the Focal Point for Delisting (in 2006) 
and Office of the Ombudsperson (in 2009, in respect of what is now called the ISIL 
(Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime). These decisions demonstrate the potential 
for regional courts (both the CJEU and ECtHR) and international institutions (the 
HRC) to restrict the ability of states to implement Security Council Resolutions, and 
thus demonstrate the ability of affected individuals to use human rights obligations 
as a collateral limit on the powers of the Security Council.
However, the jurisprudence is far from coherent. The Court of First Instance 
in Kadi would have applied Article 103 to prevent review, except in the case of a 
violation of jus cogens norms; it was the Grand Chamber of the CJEU that applied 
European law autonomously without reference to the law of the Charter. Sayadi took 
a similar view of the autonomy of the ICCPR, but with some notable dissenting 
opinions in favour of the application of the law of the Charter. The General Court 
in Kadi II expressed considerable sympathy for criticisms of Kadi, although in the 
end it chose to follow Kadi; and the Grand Chamber in Kadi II, although retaining 
its autonomous approach to European law, nonetheless adopted quite different 
reasoning than the General Court in finding that the regulations should be annulled. 
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In Al‑Dulimi, four judges applied autonomy, while three dissented and applied lex 
specialis. The jurisprudence is thus fractured in important respects — once lower 
court decisions and dissenting judgments are taken into account, it ranges from 
applications of Article 103 to the exclusion of human rights law to full applications 
of human rights law without reference to the Charter.
The reasoning employed by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Nada is 
significantly different.157 Departing from the approach of autonomy employed in 
the other decisions, Nada expressly sought to harmonise human rights law with the 
requirements of the Charter. Although on the facts the relevant regulations were held 
to breach the ECHR, in Nada the ECtHR at least attempted to achieve harmonisation 
of potentially conflicting ECHR and Charter obligations, an approach which was 
both more nuanced and more compelling than those taken in Kadi, Sayadi, Kadi II 
and Al‑Dulimi.
The Surprising Rise of Autonomy, Demise of lex superior and    
Search for Harmonisation
Perhaps the most striking feature of current practice is the absence of applications 
of the lex superior maxim (notwithstanding its frequent invocation by the states and 
organisations whose actions have been challenged).158 Instead, with the exception 
of some overruled lower court decisions and dissenting opinions, the predominant 
judicial approach has been one of autonomy, with some increasing attention being 
paid to harmonisation.
That autonomy was the approach chosen by the CJEU in Kadi and Kadi II and 
by the HRC in Sayadi is surprising. As Reinisch has noted, the CJEU in Kadi was 'radical 
in its overall attitude and … uncompromisingly dualist with regard to its view of the 
relationship between international law and European law'.159 Indeed, Tomuschat has 
observed strikingly: 'Human rights should never suffer. Yet, the EC/EU and its Court 
should attempt to remain within the agreed international frameworks rather than 
opting for the construction of a fortress Europe'.160 Conversely, Lenaerts has praised 
the giving of 'priority to the constitutional identity of the EU'.161 Notwithstanding 
the simplicity of autonomy, which requires (largely) only the application of existing 
157 See, for example, de Wet, above n 134, 790.
158 This approach has not been without academic support. See, for example, Aust, 'Kadi', above n 44, 
295-6.
159 Peter Hilpold, 'UN Sanctions Before the ECJ: The Kadi Case' in August Reinisch (ed), Challenging 
Acts of International Organizations Before National Courts (Oxford University Press, 2010) 18, 19.
160 Tomuschat, above n 62, 663.
161 Lenaerts, above n 62, 709.
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legal tests and doctrines, it fails to consider the relationship between the human 
rights obligations of states and their obligations under the Charter. D'Aspremont and 
Dopagne have celebrated the decisions as a welcome reminder 'that legal orders are 
naturally and inextricably estranged from each other',162 but even they concede that 
the decisions create 'sweeping practical difficulties which member States now face to 
comply with their UN obligations'.163
Autonomy is only as persuasive as the frequent attempts made by its 
proponents to characterise the resulting review as relevant only to national or regional 
measures, and not impacting Security Council Resolutions.164 Given that the result is 
to deny implementation of those Resolutions, this distinction is difficult to support. 
Nonetheless, it is autonomy that is the chief conceptual approach employed in the 
decisions examined in this chapter.
The rise of autonomy has resulted in the demise of lex superior as a conceptual 
approach to the relationship between international human rights law and the law 
of the Charter. Although at the opposite end of the spectrum to autonomy, the 
application of lex superior would not have been surprising, given the wording of 
Article 103. Instead, the demise of lex superior, confined to overruled lower court 
decisions and dissenting opinions, has been remarkable.165
Harmonisation, the approach arguably most apposite to the relationship 
between human rights law and the law of the Charter, was a surprising omission 
from Kadi, Sayadi, Kadi  II and Al‑Dulimi. In its decision in Nada, however, the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR adopted harmonisation as its conceptual approach. 
Whilst the result reached was the same (the sanctions-implementing measure was 
held to breach human rights law), the fact that an attempt was made to co-apply the 
two systems of international law was an important departure from the approaches of 
the CJEU and HRC. It remains to be seen how the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
162 D'Aspremont and Dogagne, above n 58, 372.
163 Ibid 377.
164 'Of course, formally, the ECJ is right: the Security Council measures cannot be affected by 
EU courts' review of EU implementing measures … But the ECJ decision does force the EU member 
states to violate their obligations under the Charter of the UN: it forces them to disobey the Security 
Council, lest they disobey the EU  court': Antonios Tzanakopoulos, 'Kadi Showdown: Substantive 
Review of (UN) Sanctions by the ECJ' on EJIL:  Talk! (19  July  2013) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/
kadi-showdown/>.
165 This is so even accepting that '[i]n view of its exceptional character … [b]efore Art. 103 is used, 
conflict avoidance techniques need to be applied (such as harmonization …) to avoid incompatibilities 
between Charter law and other international agreements': Andreas Paulus and Johann Ruben Leiß, 
'Article 103' in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 2110, 2120.
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will approach the issues when it decides the appeal in Al‑Dulimi, after the Second 
Section's split between autonomy and lex specialis.
Questions of harmonisation are perhaps particularly relevant given that 
respect for human rights is contained within the Charter itself. Article  24(2) of 
the Charter requires the Security Council to 'act in accordance with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations'. Relevantly, those 'Purposes and Principles' 
include in Article 1(3) 'promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms'.166 Moreover, as de Wet has noted, the approach of 
harmonisation 'reduces the risk of an open rebellion against and destabilisation of 
the United Nations system for the protection of international peace and security'. De 
Wet further notes that harmonisation 'contributes to the unity of the international 
legal order and serves as a counter-force against fragmentation of international law'.167 
In short, harmonisation is the appropriate tool to reconcile the co-application of 
potentially competing regimes of international law. As Klabbers has noted regarding 
the decisions examined in this chapter, 'the international legal order has far more to 
offer than the stark choice between blind obedience and outright disobedience'.168
Of course, the difficulties of harmonisation should not be underestimated. 
They are patent in the dissenting opinion of Ruth Wedgwood in Sayadi: 'Human 
rights and the enforcement decisions of the Security Council share a common concern 
for the lives of innocent people'.169 This identification of a common purpose says little 
about which regime is to prevail in case of conflict. For Wedgwood (dissenting) in 
Sayadi, it was the Charter obligation.170 For the ECtHR in Nada, it was the human 
rights obligation.171 How harmonisation can be achieved remains an open question 
for the future. The ECtHR's approach in Nada is not the last word on this topic,172 
166 Art 55(c) further provides that 'the United Nations shall promote … universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion', albeit that the responsibility for this provision falls to the General Assembly and 
the Economic and Social Council.
167 De Wet, above n 134, 806 [48].
168 Klabbers, above n 42, 489.
169 Sayadi, UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, app A, 30 (Ruth Wedgwood). See also Clementine 
Olivier, 'Human Rights and the International Fight Against Terrorism: How do Security Council 
Resolutions Impact on States' Obligations under International Human Rights Law? (Revisiting Security 
Council Resolution 1373)' (2004) 73 Nordic Journal of International Law 399, 403-4.
170 Sayadi, UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, app A, 30 (Ruth Wedgwood).
171 Nada (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application  No  10593/08, 12  September  2012) 46-53 
[170]-[199].
172 The actual application of the principle in Nada has been criticised as 'an example of covert rejection 




nor will its pending decision in Al‑Dulimi resolve all of the issues. Nonetheless, as a 
conceptual approach to resolving the need to co-apply human rights law and the law 
of the Charter, harmonisation is the best hope for the development over time of a 
coherent jurisprudence.
Equilibrium
In an important sense, the cases examined in this chapter show the international legal 
system returning to a position of equilibrium. Reflection on two earlier comments 
appears illustrative. In 1994, Wilhelm Grewe wrote that
the more the SC appears willing and capable of operating in the way originally 
envisaged by the drafters of the Charter, the more apparent it becomes that 
there are virtually no substantial limitations on the powers conferred upon the 
Council.173
Conversely, the Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in the Lockerbie Case asked:
Are there any limits to the Council's powers of appreciation? In the equilibrium 
of forces underpinning the structure of the United Nations within the evolving 
international order, is there any conceivable point beyond which a legal issue 
may properly arise as to the competence of the Security Council to produce 
such overriding results?174
One interpretation of the cases examined in this chapter, which use international 
human rights law as a collateral limit on the power of the Security Council, is that 
equilibrium in the international order is being restored after the earlier rise of the 
Security Council.175
These cases also reveal two other forms of equilibrium being sought: first, the 
balance of power between the EU and UN (a topic generally outside the scope of 
this chapter); and second, as Hilpold's description of Kadi reminds us, 'equilibrium 
between the need to fight terrorism more effectively and the parallel need to uphold 
fundamental rights in this struggle'.176
173 Wilhelm G Grewe, 'The History of the United Nations' in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 1994) 1, 22.
174 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures) [1992] 
ICJ Rep 3, 32 (emphasis added). Judge Shahabuddeen did not answer these questions, but observed 
(at 32): 'If the answers to these delicate and complex questions are all in the negative, the position is 
potentially curious. It would not, on that account, be necessarily unsustainable in law'.
175 See, for example, van den Herik, above n 141, 4-12.
176 Hilpold, 'EU and UN Law in Conflict', above n 69, 181. Similarly, Margulies states that the 
CJEU  in Kadi  II 'failed to pay sufficient heed to the delicate balance between fairness and efficacy 
in counterterrorism sanctions': Peter Margulies, 'Aftermath of an Unwise Decision: The UN Terrorist 
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The cases examined in this chapter can be seen as searching for an equilibrium 
in the power dynamic between EU and UN law, between the Security Council and 
its non-members, and between the suppression of terrorism and protection of human 
rights. It should not be expected that the equilibrium represented on any of these 
three issues by the cases examined will remain static into the future: these will each be 
dynamic areas of future practice.
The Security Council Has Only Itself to Blame
To a significant extent, the Security Council's troubles are of its own making. Its 
disregard of human rights issues can hardly have endeared it to the various judicial 
bodies before whom claims have been made seeking to impose collateral limits on the 
Council's powers. The Security Council also had no lack of forewarning of the human 
rights difficulties of its Resolutions.177 The dissenting opinion (on admissibility) of Sir 
Nigel Rodley, Ivan Shearer and Iulia Antoanella Motoc in Sayadi was clear in its view 
of the Council's failings:
We acknowledge, of course, that the authors may have been unjustly harmed 
by operation of the extravagant powers the Security Council has arrogated 
to itself, including the obstacles it has created to the correction of error. It is 
more than a little disturbing that the executive branches of 15 Member States 
appear to claim a power, with none of the consultation or checks and balances 
that would be applicable at the national level, to simply discard centuries of 
States' constitutional traditions of providing bulwarks against exorbitant 
and oppressive executive action. However, the Security Council cannot be 
impleaded under the Covenant, much less the Optional Protocol.178
Similarly, Judge Malinverni in Nada sought to show that the problem was of the 
Security Council's own creation, quoting Constance Grewe's statement that
Sanctions Regime After Kadi  II' (2014) 6 Amsterdam Law Forum 51, 63. Notably, the resurgence 
of human rights protection in the cases examined in this chapter responds to the observation 'that 
since 2001 the balance between rights and security has shifted towards the latter, the UN individual 
counter-terrorist sanctions being a prime example of the shift towards protection of the security of the 
state at the cost of human rights guarantees': Willems, above n 116, 55.
177 See, for example, Iain Cameron, 'UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European 
Convention on Human Rights' (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of International Law 159; Andrew Hudson, 
'Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights' 
(2007) 25 Berkeley Journal of International Law 203; Ian Johnstone, 'Legislation and Adjudication in 
the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit' (2008) 102 American Journal of 
International Law 275, 294-9.
178 Sayadi, UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, app A, 27.
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for as long as the United Nations has not introduced a human rights protection 
mechanism … comparable or equivalent to that introduced in the member 
States and at European level, the domestic and European courts remain 
competent to verify that acts implementing Security Council decisions respect 
fundamental rights.179
Judge Malinverni added:
Accordingly, any insufficient, or even deficient, protection of those rights in the 
context of the United Nations system, where it has not been compensated for 
by a review of such respect at domestic level, should lead the Court to find a 
violation of the Convention.180
The corollary of the point that the Security Council has only itself to blame is that 
part of the solution might lie with the Council as well. If a more careful approach to 
human rights had been taken by the Security Council from the outset, one wonders 
whether there would have been as much practice imposing collateral limits on the 
powers of the Council.181 It seems too late, however, for a return to the Security 
Council's perception as all-powerful under an application of the lex superior maxim.182
Nonetheless, as de Wet has suggested, improved protection of human rights 
at the Security Council level, perhaps by a judicial or quasi-judicial procedure, could 
lead to some level of 'judicial deference by the European courts' in their review of 
EU  measures implementing Security Council Resolutions.183 Similarly, Martínez 
suggests that '[t]he most reasonable solution … would consist of the establishment 
of an independent body at the UN with power to adjudicate on claims of individuals 
and entities against their inclusion on the consolidated list'.184 Greater action to 
protect human rights by the Security Council could, therefore, both increase the 
likelihood of judicial deference from international, regional and national courts and 
179 Nada (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application No 10593/08, 12 September 2012) 76 [24] (Judge 
Malinverni), quoting Constance Grewe, 'Les exigences de la protection des droits fondamentaux', in 
Constance Grewe et al (eds), Sanctions ciblées et protections juridictionnelles des droits fondamentaux dans 
l'Union européenne; équilibres et déséquilibres de la balance (Bruylant, 2010) 71, [no pinpoint reference is 
provided by Judge Malinverni].
180 Nada (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application No 10593/08, 12 September 2012) 76 [24].
181 See, for example, Eeckhout, above n 62.
182 Cf ibid; Hilpold, 'EU and UN Law in Conflict', above n 69, 179.
183 De Wet, above n 134, 799 [29]. De Wet cautions: 'Until such a time as impartial and independent 
judicial review is introduced at the United Nations level … judicial rebellion … is unlikely to subside 
in Europe': at 807 [50].
184 Martínez, above n 41, 356-7.
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monitoring bodies, and increase the potential for harmonisation to result in some 
meaningful application of Article 103.
Europe Is Not the World: Wider Practice Will Be Important
The relationship between the Charter and international human rights law is far from 
settled, even in the context of the sanctions regimes which are the subject of the 
decisions examined in this chapter. Amongst other issues, much of the existing practice 
is European, and European law is not international law. Kadi might be a high-water 
mark of European constitutionalism,185 but it is its significance for international law 
that is of global interest.
To return to one of Professor Gardam's most helpful admonitions to students, it 
is important to consider the sources of international law. Whatever their status within 
the EU under its treaty arrangements, at best, judicial decisions can be a subsidiary 
source of international law.186 If there is to be a change in the interpretation and 
application of Article 103 at international level, in the absence of a formal agreement 
amending the Charter, this can occur only as an instance of 'subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation' under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.187
One of the clearest examples of the evolution in application of a treaty 
provision comes from the Charter itself: Article 27(3) is interpreted, notwithstanding 
its text, to prevent a Resolution being passed only if a 'no' vote is cast by a permanent 
member.188 It may well be the case that a less absolute interpretation of Article 103 
185 See, for example, D'Aspremont and Dogagne, above n 58; Giuseppe Martinico, Oreste Pollicino 
and Vincenzo Sciarabba, 'Hands off the Untouchable Core: A Constitutional Appraisal of the Kadi 
Case' (2010) 11 European Journal of Law Reform 281.
186 Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38(1)(d).
187 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980). As to subsequent agreement and practice in treaty interpretation, 
see Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2013) 212-16; 
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 7th  ed, 2008) 633-4; 
Oliver Dörr, 'Article 31' in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer, 2012) 521, 552-60; Hazel Fox, 'Article  31(3)(a) and (b) 
of the Vienna Convention and the Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case' in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi A 
Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds), Issues of Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties: 30 Years On (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) 59; Richard K Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 216-49; Sir Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Manchester University Press, 2nd ed, 1984) 135-8.
188 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution  276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] 
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becomes evident in the future practice of states, in line with the decisions examined 
in this chapter; but there is as yet no compelling account of state practice in the 
interpretation of the Charter to suggest that international law has in fact changed 
to align with the judgments issued in Kadi, Sayadi, Kadi II and Al‑Dulimi. Whether 
state practice from outside the EU will follow where the CJEU and HRC have led 
remains to be seen in the future.
Reports of the Death of Article 103 Are Greatly Exaggerated189
James Crawford's verse about Mr Kadi's litigation ran as follows:
While wandering through a wadi
in the wastes of Saudi
I came across Mr Kadi
cracking rather hardy.
I said 'you must feel blue
at what they've done to you';
he said to me 'that's true,
but I've got the CJEU,
lacking whose authority
the P5 sorority
are now a small minority,
who've lost their old priority'.
And so went Mr Kadi
wandering down his wadi:
'it's all because of me;
I killed Article 103!'190
As the analysis in this chapter demonstrates, Article  103 may not be dead yet. 
However, even at best (in Nada) it has been seriously harmonised. Article 103 remains 
an essential part of the international legal order ('maintaining the coherence and the 
unity of the international legal system'),191 although it is now possibly of more limited 
ICJ Reps 16, 22. See, for example, Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, above n 187, 215-16; Dörr, 
above n 187, 558; Fox, above n 187, 62; Gardiner, above n 187, 226, 245; Sinclair, above n 187, 137-8.
189 With apologies to Mark Twain.
190 James Crawford, 'Mr Kadi and Article 103 (A Poem)' on EJIL: Talk! (29 July 2013) <http://www.
ejiltalk.org/mr-kadi-and-article-103-by-james-crawford-a-poem/>.
191 Paulus and Leiß, above n 165, 2136.
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scope than previously thought. Of course, Crawford's implication that the Security 
Council has had its wings clipped is entirely apposite.192
Only future practice will further illuminate how Article 103 is to be harmonised 
with international human rights law, and how (and whether) it will also need to 
be harmonised with other branches of international law (perhaps the most obvious 
being international humanitarian law). It seems clear, however, that the application 
of Article 103 will require nuanced examination, and where necessary harmonisation 
with other norms, and that the lex superior status of the Charter can no longer be 
relied upon to trump other areas of law. An absolutist understanding of Article 103 
is dead; how the law of the Charter can be harmonised with other areas of law is the 
real question for the future.
ConCLudinG obsErVations
It is now a reality, at least in the EU, that the human rights obligations of states function 
as a collateral limit on the powers of the Security Council through restricting the 
implementation of Security Council Resolutions at national or regional level. At the 
time of Professor Gardam's 1996 article on the Security Council and humanitarian 
law, such a result might have seemed improbable. In that respect, much has changed. 
Indeed, the potential for collateral challenges to Security Council Resolutions has 
been recognised as 'a far greater threat to the authority of the UN than challenges 
to the bindingness of a particular Security Council resolution as in the Lockerbie 
Cases'.193
The possible conceptual approaches to the relationship between the law of 
the Charter and human rights law range from lex superior, a strict application of 
Article 103 of the Charter to exclude any form of review of measures implementing 
Security Council Resolutions, to autonomy, a strict application of human rights law 
with no consideration of the Charter. In the critical cases examined in this chapter, 
both of these extremes are represented, although the more moderate and nuanced 
approach of harmonisation has at least entered consideration in Nada.
It was the application of autonomy by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in 
Kadi and Kadi II, the HRC in Sayadi, and later by the Second Section of the ECtHR 
in Al‑Dulimi that sent shockwaves through the international legal community. In 
Nada, however, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR signalled the middle ground 
192 But see James Crawford, 'International Law and the Rule of Law' (2003) 24 Adelaide Law 
Review 3, 10: 'It may be that decisions of the Security Council are subject to the authority of the Charter, 





that should be the focus of future practice (notwithstanding that it did not persuade 
the CJEU to use this approach in Kadi II, and that it was not adopted in the Second 
Section's decision in Al‑Dulimi) — the question of harmonising Charter obligations 
with those of human rights law, seeking to accommodate both as far as possible.
The current practice arising from the challenges in regional and international 
institutions to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions reflects the 
tension that Professor Gardam observed between the law of the Charter and the 
humanitarian project reflected in human rights law (and humanitarian law). The 
process of exploring and defining these relationships has only just begun, although 
the potential for the human rights obligations of states to serve as a potent collateral 
limit on the powers of the Security Council is abundantly clear. However, enforcing 
collateral limits on the Security Council, and achieving harmonisation of the law 
of the Charter with human rights law, is only necessary where there is potential 
normative conflict. An alternative would be to follow Professor Gardam's advice:
[O]ne method by which the Security Council can fulfill its Charter duty to 
encourage respect for human rights and humanitarian principles is to set an 
example and ensure its … actions are conducted in an exemplary fashion.194
194 Gardam, above n 5, 322.
